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Abstract
We assess the consequences of increases in the scale of tax and transfer
programs in the context of a model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and incomplete markets. We contrast the outcomes for both hours worked
and welfare relative to the results obtained in a stand-in household model,
featuring no idiosyncratic shocks and complete markets. Our main finding
is that the impact on hours remains very large, but the welfare consequences
are very diﬀerent. The analysis also suggests that tax and transfer policies
may have large eﬀects on average labor productivty via selection eﬀects on
employment.
∗We thank seminar participants at the CEPR conference held in Budapest in October 2008.
Rogerson thanks the NSF for financial support.
1. Introduction
Following Prescott (2004), a recent literature has sought to assess the extent to
which cross-country diﬀerences in the size of tax and transfer systems can account
for the large diﬀerences in hours of work across countries.1 Much of this work takes
place in the context of the neoclassical growth model with a stand-in household.
Given that this model is the benchmark model of modern macroeconomics, it is
natural to use it as a starting point for thinking about the aggregate eﬀects of
tax and transfer programs. However, it is also of interest to analyze the extent to
which deviations from this model might influence our assessment of the eﬀects of
tax and transfer programs on aggregate allocations and welfare. The goal of this
paper is to carry out such an analysis in another framework that has become very
popular for addressing macroeconomic issues: the incomplete markets model of
Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), extended to allow for an endogenous labor
supply decision.2
The key feature of this model is that individuals face idiosyncratic shocks to
their productivity in the market sector, but do not have access to insurance mar-
kets. To smooth consumption in the face of these productivity shocks, individuals
can vary their saving behavior and their labor supply behavior. Previous work
using this model suggests that it may have interesting implications for the analysis
of tax and transfer programs. First, from the perspective of how tax and transfer
1See also Rogerson (2006, 2008), Ragan (2006), Ohanian et al (2008), and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006, 2008), and McDaniel (2008) for related work.
2Our exercise can be seen as analogous to the exercise of Krusell and Smith (1998), who
assessed the extent to which productivity shocks had diﬀerent eﬀects in the incomplete markets
model relative to the stand-in household model.
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programs aﬀect allocations, Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) find that the hetero-
geneity induced by idiosyncratic productivity shocks plays an important role in
determining the aggregate labor supply elasticity. Second, from the perspective of
how tax and transfer programs aﬀect welfare, Pijoan-Mas (2006) shows that in the
absence of taxes, the competitive equilibrium in this model has ineﬃciently high
labor supply, due to the fact that individuals rely at least partly on labor supply
to smooth consumption in the face of negative productivity shocks. Floden and
Linde (2001) have previously carried out an analysis of tax programs in such a
model and highlight some interesting properties. Our calculations are very similar
to theirs, with the main diﬀerence between the focus of the analysis.
We calibrate the model and analyze the eﬀects of a simple tax and transfer
scheme that places a proportional tax on labor earnings that is used to fund a
lump sum transfer that is uniform across all individuals. Our main findings are as
follows. First, from the perspective of accounting for diﬀerences in hours worked
between the US and European countries such as Belgium, France, Germany and
Italy, then the results are similar to the stand-in household model. That is, we
find that an increase in the tax rate from .30 to .50 leads to a drop in hours
worked of 27%, versus 29% in the stand-in household model. Second, the welfare
implications are very diﬀerent. Whereas the stand-in household model implies
that optimal allocations are achieved with zero taxes and transfers, the model
with idiosyncratic shocks implies that a substantial tax and transfer program has
the ability to enhance steady state welfare. While moving from an American sized
tax and transfer scheme to a European sized tax and transfer scheme still implies
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a welfare loss, the magnitude of the loss is much smaller. Third, we find that
tax and transfer programs have a substantial positive impact on average labor
productivity, measured as output per hour, due to the selection eﬀects associated
with the eﬀects of tax and transfer schemes on employment. In light of this result
we suggest that the apparent catchup of several European countries to the US in
terms of productivity may be an illusion.
We also explore how the properties of the stochastic process describing idio-
syncratic shocks influences these results. There are two eﬀects of interest, which
we illustrate by considering a change in the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks.
An increase in persistence implies that a given expansion of the tax and transfer
system leads to larger eﬀects on hours and smaller eﬀects on welfare. The reason
for this is that increases in persistence lead individual agents to make more use of
labor supply to smooth consumption, leading to more work being done by workers
with low productivity realizations. In this case a larger tax and transfer system
will have large eﬀects on hours worked, but the decrease in hours worked by low
productivity workers moves the equilibrium allocation closer to the eﬃcient alloca-
tion. The other eﬀect is the one emphasized by Chang and Kim—the more spread
out is the distribution of individual state variables, the smaller is the aggregate
response to a change in the aggregate return to work, since fewer individuals will
be close to the threshold which has them change their labor supply decision from
working to not working.
The objective of this paper is similar in spirit to recent work by Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2006, 2008). They also investigate the extent to which uncertainty
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and incomplete markets aﬀect the findings of earlier studies. The key diﬀerence
between their analysis and ours is in the type of uncertainty that is considered.
Whereas Ljungqvist and Sargent consider stochastic transitions between two lev-
els of skill in a life cycle model, we calibrate our model to match all movements in
productivity. Similar to us, they find that uncertainty and incomplete markets has
relatively little eﬀect on the magnitude of the response of aggregate employment.
As noted earlier, our paper is most similar to Floden and Linde (2001). They
also assess the impact of changes in tax and transfer programs in a model with
idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete markets. Our model diﬀers from theirs in
that we do not allow for permanent heterogeneity and we assume that labor is in-
divisible. Most importantly, we also focus on diﬀerent aspects of the implications,
including, for example, the implications for labor productivity.
An outline of the paper follows. In the next section we summarize the eﬀects
of changes in tax and transfer programs in the stand-in household model. Section
3 describes the incomplete markets model with idiosyncratic shocks. Section four
calibrates this model and reports the results of how changes in tax and transfer
programs will influence aggregate allocations and welfare. Section 5 focuses on
some of the other aspects of the analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Tax and Transfers in the Stand-in Household Model
For purposes of comparison it is of interest to consider the case which has been
the benchmark for the previous literature. There is a continuum of mass one of
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identical individuals, each with preferences defined by:
∞X
t=0
βt[log(ct) + v(1− ht)]
where v is an increasing function. Labor is assumed to be indivisible, so that in
any period ht is restricted to take on the values of 0 or 1. It follows that the only
aspect of v(1− h) that matters are the two values v(0) and v(1). It is convenient
to normalize v(1) to be zero and to let v(0) = −α. As is well known, if we assume
that individuals can trade employment lotteries, then we can consider an economy
with a single household with preferences given by3:
∞X
t=0
βt[log(ct)− αht]
where ht now represents the fraction of the households that are employed in period
t.
Technology is described by an aggregate production function F (kt, ht), as-
sumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
yt = kθth1−θt .
Output can be used as either consumption or investment, and capital depreciates
at rate δ.
Following Prescott (2004) we assume a government that taxes labor earnings
at the constant proportional rate τ and uses the proceeds to finance a lump-sum
3Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) show that lotteries are not essential in achieving this result
in a continuous time version of the model. Krusell et al (2008) show this is also true for
characterizing steady state outcomes in a discrete time model.
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transfer T using a period-by-period balanced budget rule:
Tt = τwth
where wt is the period t wage.
We focus on the steady state of this economy. Assuming that the solution for h
is interior, the three following conditions characterize the steady state equilibrium:
F1(k, h) =
1
β
− (1− δ) (2.1)
αc = (1− τ)F2(k, h) (2.2)
c = F (k, h)− δk (2.3)
It is easy to infer the eﬀects of an increase in the tax and transfer program, indexed
by τ . Equation (2.1) implies that τ has no impact on the steady state value of
k/h. Given k/h, the right hand side of equation () is decreasing in τ , so that c is
proportional to (1− τ). Moreover, given a value for k/h, equation (2.3) implies a
linear relationship between h and c, so that h is also proportional to (1− τ).
To assess the quantitative implications, consider a standard calibration of the
above model to the US economy. Specifically, letting a period denote a year,
choose values for β, θ, and δ so as to match targets for the real rate of return to
capital (4%) , the capital-output ratio (2.5) and the investment-output ratio (.2)
in the steady state. The implied values are β = .96, θ = 1/3, δ = .08. Letting
τ = .3 represent the average eﬀective tax on labor income in the US, α is chosen
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so that steady state employment is .80. We can then ask what happens to steady
state h as we consider diﬀerent values of τ .
To compute the (steady state) welfare consequences of diﬀerent tax rates we
compute the proportional increase in consumption, denoted by∆, required to leave
the household indiﬀerent between the two steady state allocations. A positive
value of ∆ indicates that welfare is lower than in the τ = .3 steady state, while
a negative value for ∆ indicates that welfare is higher than in the τ = .3 steady
state. Table 1 presents results.
Table 1
Eﬀect of Taxes in the Stand-in Household Model
τ = 0 τ = .1 τ = .2 τ = .3 τ = .4 τ = .5
h(τ)/h(.3) 1.25 1.25 1.14 1.00 .85 .71
∆ -.08 -.08 -.05 .00 .07 .18
As noted earlier, changes in τ do not have any eﬀect on k/h and as a result do
not have any impact on either k/y or y/h, so we do not report these statistics. The
eﬀect of taxes on hours worked is large: starting from the τ = .3 steady state,
the eﬀect of a ten percentage point change in tax rates is a change of roughly
15% in aggregate hours worked, independently of whether taxes are increased or
decreased. We note that when τ is reduced to .1, the steady state allocation has
everyone working, so that further reductions in taxes do not have any impact on
steady state hours worked. In this model the equilibrium without taxes yields
a Pareto eﬃcient allocation. The steady state welfare measure abstracts from
transition dynamics, but nonetheless the table shows that steady state welfare
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is highest when taxes are set to zero, though for this calibration a tax rate of
τ = .1 yields the same allocation. The same studies that produce estimates of
the average tax rate on labor equal to .30 in the US suggest a value of .50 for the
continental European economies of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.4 From
the above table we see that this model predicts almost a thirty percent reduction
in hours of work and a welfare cost equal to 18% of steady state consumption.
3. The Incomplete Markets Model
In this section we describe the incomplete markets model that is the focus of this
study. Our model is in the spirit of the incomplete markets models of Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994), and is basically the same as the one in Chang and
Kim (2007). It is very similar to that in Floden and Linde (2001), and Pijoan-Mas
(2006) with the main diﬀerence being that we assume indivisible labor. Because
coordination problems within organizations often restrict the ability of individuals
to work significantly diﬀerent hours than their coworkers, we believe that the indi-
visible labor assumption is an appropriate one in contexts that stress idiosyncratic
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Pijoan-Mas (2006) concludes that the labor supply
elasticity must be very small in order to reconcile the large cross-sectional diﬀer-
ences in productivity with the relatively small cross-sectional diﬀerences in hours.
However, if the low variance in hours is due to technological factors that require
some degree of coordination of hours across workers, this procedure will bias the
4Mendoza et al (1994) was an early contribution to this literature. More recently McDaniel
(2006) has produced longer time series using a variation on the method used by Mendoza et al
along the lines of what Prescott (2004) did.
8
estimated preference parameters. For this reason we think that the indivisible
labor assumption is preferable in this context.
As earlier, we assume that there is a continuum of mass one of individuals,
indexed by i, each of whom has preferences described by:
∞X
t=0
βt[log(cit)− αhit]
where hit can take on the values 0 or 1. There is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate
production function that uses capital (Kt) and labor (Lt) to produce output:
Yt = Kθt L1−θt
where we now use upper case letters to denote aggregate values, since individual
and aggregate values will no longer be the same. We assume that individual
productivity is stochastic. Let eit denote individual productivity for individual i
in period t. We assume that it follows an AR(1) process in logs: The persistent
component follows a process of the form:
log eit+1 = ρ log eit + εit.
where εit is normally distributed, with mean and standard deviation given by με
and σε respectively. We denote the density functions of ε by f ε(ε). Realizations
are assumed to be iid across individuals. We assume that period t productivity
is realized before any period t decisions are made. Because of the idiosyncratic
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productivity shocks, aggregate labor input Lt is not simply the aggregate input
of time, but is instead a weighted integral of time inputs:
Lt =
Z 1
0
eithitdi
As before, output can be used as either consumption or investment and capital
depreciates at rate δ. We again consider a government that taxes labor income at
constant rate τ and uses the proceeds to fund a lump-sum transfer that is uniform
across all individuals, subject to a period-by-period balanced budget constraint.
We consider the following market structure. At each date t there are factor
markets for capital and labor services, and a market for output. There are no
insurance markets, but individuals can self-insure by accumulating capital. We
require that individual capital holdings be non-negative, which implies that there
are eﬀectively no markets for borrowing and lending, i.e., capital accumulation
is the only channel through which individuals can move resources across periods.
Once again we focus on steady state equilibrium. Let w and r denote the steady
state equilibrium rental prices for labor services and capital services. An individual
with idiosyncratic productivity e who chooses to work will then earn labor income
equal to ew. An individual who enters the period with capital holdings k and
has current realization of e for productivity faces the following one period budget
constraint:
c+ k0 = (1− δ)k + rk + (1− τ)ewh+ T
where k0 is next period’s capital.
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The state vector for an individual is s = (k, e). Denoting the individual value
function by V (k, e), the Bellman equation for an individual in steady state is given
by:
V (k, e) = max
c,h,k0
{log c− ah+ β
Z
V (k0, exp(ρe) exp(ε))f ε(ε0)dε0
s.t. c+ k0 = (1− δ)k + rk + (1− τ)ewh+ T , c ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0, h ∈ {0, 1}
In what follows we will consider how changes in τ aﬀect the steady state
equilibrium, so it will be useful to include τ as a parameter of functions that
describe the equilibrium. Specifically, let c(s; τ), k0(s; τ), and h(s; τ) denote the
individual decision rules in steady state for a given value of τ , and let μ(s; τ) be
the measure that describes the distribution of individuals across state vectors as
a function of τ . Steady state aggregates are then expressed as:
H(τ) =
Z
h(s; τ)dμ, L(τ) =
Z
eh(s; τ)dμ, K(τ) =
Z
kdμ
and steady state prices satisfy:
r(τ) = F1(K(τ), L(τ)), w(τ) = F2(K(τ), L(τ))
Steady-state welfare will be given by:
W (τ) = 1
1− β
Z
[log(c(s; τ))− αh(s; τ)]dμ
Relative to a baseline value of τ , the steady state change in welfare associated with
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a change of τ to some other value τ 0 is again defined as the proportional increase in
consumption for all agents that would be required to equate the welfare measures,
i.e., the value of ∆ that solves:
1
1− β
Z
[log(c(s; τ))− αh(s; τ)]dμ = 1
1− β
Z
[log((1 +∆)c(s; τ 0))− αh(s; τ 0)]dμ0
where μ0 is the measure of individuals over state vectors for τ 0. As before, a
negative value of ∆ indicates a welfare gain and a positive value of ∆ indicates a
welfare loss relative to the baseline.
4. Quantitative Eﬀects of Tax and Transfer Programs
In this section we consider the quantitative eﬀects of a change in the magnitude
of the tax and transfer system in the context of the incomplete markets model.
4.1. Calibration
Relative to the benchmark model described in Section 2, the only additional pa-
rameters introduced in the incomplete markets model are the parameters that
describe the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Sub-
ject to choosing these parameters, we will then choose the remaining parameters
so that we match the same aggregate targets as in Section 2, though of course we
note that the mapping from parameters to steady state values is more complex
in the incomplete markets model. There is a sizeable literature that estimates
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idiosyncratic shock processes, including Card (1994), Floden and Linde (2001),
Heathcote et al (2004), French (2005), Chang and Kim (2006) and Low et al
(2009). These papers typically estimate this process for prime aged males. The
common feature of this literature is that the process is found to be very persistent,
with most estimates .9 or higher. For our benchmark case in which we adopt an
intermediate value of .94, which happens to coincide with the point estimate of
Heathcote et al (2004). For the variance of the idiosyncratic shock we assume a
value of .21. We also explore how the model behaves when ρ = .50.
The approximation method used to find the steady state equilibrium is stan-
dard. To solve the individual decision problem we use value function iteration.
The value function is approximated by a piece-wise linear function. Golden sec-
tion search is used on a discrete grid over the state space. Montecarlo simulation
is used to approximate the distribution of the economy and we search over prices
and transfers until the market clearing condition and budget balance conditions
are satisfied.5
4.2. Results
Table 2 reports the results for the benchmark specification.
5In solving the model we assume a grid with 91 points for assets and 21 values for the
idiosyncratic shocks.
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Table 2
The Eﬀect of Taxes (All Variables are Relative to τ = .30)
τ = 0 τ = .10 τ = .20 τ = .30 τ = .40 τ = .50
H 1.15 1.12 1.08 1.00 .89 .73
L 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.00 .94 .85
K 1.13 1.09 1.05 1.00 .93 .83
Y 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.00 .94 .84
Y/H .96 .96 .97 1.00 1.05 1.15
Y/K .97 .98 .99 1.00 1.01 1.01
K/L 1.05 1.03 1.01 1.00 .98 .98
∆ .044 .022 .007 0.00 .010 .041
We begin by looking at the eﬀects on aggregate hours of work. Hours of work
are again decreasing in the scale of the tax and transfer program. Moreover, the
magnitude of this eﬀect is very similar to that found in the benchmark analysis
in Section 2. There we found that an increase of taxes from .3 to .5 led to a
decline in hours worked of roughly 29%, while in the above table the eﬀect is
slightly smaller at 27%. So from the narrow perspective of assessing the extent
to which diﬀerences in taxes account for the diﬀerences in hours of work between
the US and the high-tax economies of continental Europe, this model provides
basically the same answer as the stand-in household model. But if one looks
beyond this specific calculation, the two models do oﬀer some diﬀerent predictions.
Previously we found that a ten percent change in taxes starting from τ = .30 lead
to approximately a 15% change in hours for both tax increases and decreases.
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Now the eﬀect is not so close to symmetric and somewhat smaller; a ten percent
decrease in taxes leads to an increase in hours of 8%, whereas a ten percent
increase in taxes leads to a decrease in hours of 11%. Finally, the eﬀect of taxes
increases is less linear: the eﬀect of increasing taxes from .4 to .5 is now much
larger than the eﬀect of an increase from .3 to .4.
In the stand-in household model changes in hours worked were the same as
changes in labor input. A key feature of this model is that these two are not nec-
essarily the same. In fact, the table shows that there is a very striking diﬀerence
in the extent of the change in the two quantities. Specifically, changes in hours
worked are much larger than changes in labor input. For the case of a change in τ
from .3 to .5, the decrease in hours worked is almost twice as large as the decrease
in labor input. This discrepancy is due to the fact that as the tax and transfer
system is expanded, the response in hours worked is concentrated among workers
with low productivity. Intuitively, the tax and transfer program provides partial
insurance against idiosyncratic productivity shocks—payments into the system are
highest when productivity is highest, and the transfer payment is the same in-
dependent of individual productivity. As emphasized by Pijoan-Mas (2006), in
the incomplete markets model individuals use both labor supply and asset ac-
cumulation to self insure, leading to excessive hours worked by low productivity
workers relative to what would happen in a complete markets equilibrium. Basi-
cally, some workers are following strategies in which they use labor supply to help
smooth consumption during periods of low productivity rather than accumulate
suﬃcient capital. The transfer payment reduces the need to rely on both labor
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and capital as a way to smooth consumption during periods of low productivity.
As a result, the increase in the tax and transfer system has a disproportionate
eﬀect on labor supply of workers with low productivity shocks.
Because of the very significant diﬀerence in the size of the decrease in H and
L, the increase in the tax and transfer program has a very significant eﬀect on
output per hour. When τ increases from .3 to .5, output per hour increases by
about 15%, while if τ were reduced to 0, output per hour would fall by 5%. This
suggests that studies which do not control for selection into employment when
comparing productivity of countries with very diﬀerent tax and transfer systems
and large diﬀerences in employment ratios may produce very biased estimates of
relative TFPs. For example, when comparing the τ = .3 and τ = .5 economies,
failure to control at all for selection into employment would lead one to conclude
that TFP was roughly 15% higher in the τ = .5 economy. We consider this in
more detail in the next section.
In the stand-in household model the tax and transfer system had no impact
on either K/L or Y/K. Because the tax and transfer program now oﬀers an
alternative to self insurance, one would expect that a tax and transfer system in
the incomplete markets model would impact on precautionary savings and hence
impact both K/L and Y/K. The table reveals that K/L is decreasing while Y/K
is increasing in the size of the tax system. However, considering the changes
associated with taxes between .30 and .50, the size of these eﬀects is quite small.
Lastly, we consider the (steady state) welfare eﬀects. In the representative
agent model, increasing τ from .3 to .5 entails a welfare loss of 18%. In the
16
incomplete markets model, this same increase in τ also entails a welfare loss, but
now it is only equal to 4%. Moreover, steady state welfare is no longer highest
when τ = 0. Because the tax and transfer program analyzed here has the potential
to partially substitute for missing insurance markets, it is plausible that such a
system can improve welfare even if it is financed by a distorting tax. In fact,
the table shows that the τ = .3 steady state is substantially better than the
τ = 0 steady state, even though output and hours worked are much lower in the
τ = .3 steady state. Conditional upon starting at the tax rate that maximizes
steady state welfare, the welfare losses associated with incremental increases in the
tax rate are substantially smaller between the stand-in household model and the
incomplete markets model. In the stand-in household model, tax increases of 10%
and 20% relative to τ = .1 lead to welfare losses of 3% and 8% respectively, whereas
in the incomplete markets model these values are 1% and 4% respectively. In both
cases the incremental loss is increasing as we move farther away from the optimal
tax. To understand this discrepancy one needs to note that in the incomplete
markets model, even at tax rates of .40 and .50 there are some individuals who
find themselves in situations where they benefit from the larger transfer.
Our main objective in this analysis has been to assess how the choice of model
influences our conclusions regarding the eﬀects of tax and transfer programs of
the magnitude found in several continental European countries on allocations and
welfare relative to the US scenario. We believe that the above analysis points to
two key findings. First, the eﬀect on hours of work of increases in tax and transfer
programs above US is broadly similar in the two diﬀerent models. Second, the
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welfare implications are dramatically diﬀerent. In the stand-in household model,
the larger tax and transfer system imposes a very large welfare burden, equivalent
to almost 20% of consumption. While the incomplete market/heterogeneous agent
economy also implies a welfare loss associated with the larger tax and transfer
system, the welfare loss is roughly one fifth as large. An important implication of
this model is that tax and transfer programs can be welfare improving. The US
scale tax and transfer system represents a significant improvement relative to the
case of no tax and transfer system, whereas the European scale system is roughly
equivalent in terms of welfare to the case of no tax and transfer system. In view
of this finding, it is perhaps much less of a challenge to account for the diﬀerent
scales of the tax and transfer programs found in the US and continental Europe.
4.3. The Role of Persistence
The fact that an increase in taxes from 30% to 50% produces decreases in hours
worked that are roughly similar in the two models may at first seem surprising
to many. Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) emphasize the fact that in a model with
heterogeneity and incomplete markets, the idiosyncratic shocks generate a distri-
bution of “reservation wages" across the population, and that as this distribution
becomes more spread out there are fewer workers who change employment status
in response to a given change in the economic environment. In view of this, one
might have expected that tax changes in the incomplete markets model would
have substantially smaller eﬀects. While this eﬀect is present, there is another
eﬀect at work. In particular, in the incomplete markets model the employment of
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workers in low productivity states is greater than what it would be in an economy
with complete insurance markets. These workers are particularly responsive to
increases in the tax and transfer program because of the partial insurance that
they oﬀer. The extent of this over-employment of workers in the low productivity
state is in turn dependent on the nature of the productivity shocks that aﬀect
workers. The more persistent is the productivity shock process, the greater is the
extent to which workers will rely on labor supply to help smooth consumption
in response to negative shocks. Put somewhat diﬀerently, in a world in which a
worker faces only small shocks that are purely transitory, we know that capital
accumulation is very eﬀective at smoothing consumption. As the shocks become
more persistent, capital accumulation becomes less eﬀective because it takes a very
large amount of capital to smooth consumption in the face of persistent shocks,
and maintaining such a large stock of capital is costly. In this case, workers will
rely more on labor supply to help smooth consumption, implying that they will
more end up working in low productivity states with greater probability. If this is
the case, then the employment decisions of these workers will be very responsive
to increases in partial insurance.
To see these eﬀects it is of interest to examine the responses to higher taxes
when the shock process is less persistent. In particular, we proceed as before,
calibrating all parameters according to the same procedure, but assuming now
that the shock process has ρ = .50 instead of ρ = .94. Table 3 presents a subset
of results of interest.
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Table 3
The Eﬀect of Taxes (All Variables are Relative to τ = .30)
τ = 0 τ = .10 τ = .20 τ = .30 τ = .40 τ = .50
H 1.13 1.10 1.06 1.00 .94 .85
L 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.00 .96 .89
Y/H .98 .98 .99 1.00 1.02 1.04
∆ −.022 −.020 −.015 0.00 .022 .063
Several diﬀerences from the previous case are worth noting. First, we see that
the magnitude of the eﬀect on hours worked is much smaller. For example, an
increase in taxes from .30 to .50 now reduces hours worked by only 15%, whereas in
the previous calculations the decrease was 27%. We also see that the productivity
eﬀects are smaller; for this same tax increase the increase in output per hour is
now only 4%, versus 15% in the previous calculations. And finally, the welfare
implications are both quantitatively and qualitatively diﬀerent. In the current
context, steady state welfare is now maximized by having taxes set equal to zero.
And the welfare cost of moving from τ = .30 to τ = .50 is higher by a factor of
1.5 (.063 versus .041). Interestingly, this eﬀect is still dramatically smaller than
in the case of the stand-in household model.
All of these diﬀerences relative to the benchmark case can be understood by
noting that the extent of employment by workers in the low productivity state
is much lower in the economy with less persistence. This in turn has several
consequences. First, because the insurance eﬀect is much smaller, we see that
the overall response in hours is indeed significantly less than it was in the case
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of the stand-in household model. This reflects the mechanism highlighted by
Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) that the distribution of reservation wages is now
more dispersed relative to the stand-in model, thereby leading to smaller labor
supply responses. Second, because the insurance eﬀect is smaller, the eﬀect of
selection is not as pronounced, implying that the gap between changes in hours
and changes in labor input is not as large. In a world with complete insurance,
workers would adopt a reservation productivity and only work when productivity
is above that threshold. And in such an economy a tax and transfer system
would raise the reservation productivity. But this channel is not as powerful a
force in aﬀecting average labor productivity because it involves workers at the
reservation value, whereas the model with persistent shocks has some people with
productivity far below this level working, and it is these people that respond to
the partial insurance oﬀered through the tax and transfer system.
One way to assess the extent to which there is “too much” employment at
low productivity states is to compare the level of employment in the incomplete
markets model with the level of employment that would result in a world with
complete insurance markets. When ρ = .94 it turns out that the τ = 0 equilibrium
has employment that is 20% higher than the complete markets equilibrium. When
ρ = .50 the τ = 0 equilibrium has the same level of employment as the complete
markets equilibrium.
This also helps us understand the very diﬀerent welfare eﬀects. The reason that
we found a welfare role for a positive tax and transfer system in the previous model
was precisely because the insurance aspects of this policy were valued highly. If
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the shocks are not as persistent, then the insurance role is not as valuable, and so
for the same reason that the hours eﬀects are smaller, the negative welfare eﬀects
become larger. However, even though the welfare eﬀects of taxes become more
negative, they are still much smaller than in the stand-in household model. As
noted in the previous subsection, this is because there are still some individuals
who find themselves in situations where the insurance is valuable.
The main messages that we want the reader to take away from this subsection
is that the eﬀects of tax increases on both allocations and welfare in the incomplete
markets model is very dependent on the nature of the idiosyncratic shock process.
There are two key channels that are relevant for the eﬀects of taxes. One has
to do with dispersion of individuals in terms of their distance from a reservation
productivity level. The second has to do with the extent to which individuals are
using labor to help smooth consumption in low productivity states. The more
important is the second channel, the larger are the eﬀects of taxes on hours of
work. But this also implies a greater role for taxes and transfers to increase
welfare. Existing empirical work suggests that idiosyncratic wage shocks are very
persistent, so that our benchmark case seems the empirically interesting case to
focus on. But it is important to note that the results are sensitive to the shock
process.
5. Additional Implications
While our main objective was to examine how the incomplete markets model
would influence predictions regarding the eﬀect of labor tax increases on hours
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worked and welfare, in this section we would like to pursue some of the additional
implications a bit further. The first of these is the implications for average labor
productivity. The second concerns the implications for tax revenue. And the third
concerns the implications for calculating wedges. We consider each in turn.
5.1. Taxes and Productivity
It is somewhat of a stylized fact that although hours of work are much less in
continental Europe than in the US, labor productivity in these countries is very
nearly equal (and in some cases even higher) than in the US. Somewhat less
publicized is the fact that in several countries, including Australia and Canada,
hours of work are very similar to US levels, whereas the level of labor productivity
is roughly 15% lower. One could argue that these productivity comparisons seem
puzzling. Theories have not yet been developed that can successfully account
for the diﬀerences in productivity levels observed across countries. But there is
some consensus that various types of factors might serve as barriers to technology
adoption, or eﬃcient operation of technologies. Examples include various forms
of regulation, the role of government, the presence of unions etc... For the most
part, these factors are more prevalent in the economies of Europe than they are in
the US. Countries such as Australia and Canada would seem to be intermediate
cases. Viewed from this perspective it is perhaps puzzling that productivity in
many European countries is so close to US levels and higher than in countries such
as Canada and Australia. Our benchmark model oﬀers a perspective on these
cross country comparisons that challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the
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productivity catch up of continental Europe.
To explore this in more detail we examine the relationship between output per
hour and total hours worked per person of working age in a recent cross section.
For each series we compute the average over the five year period 2003-2007 so
as to eliminate the eﬀect of year to year fluctuations, as well as avoid the eﬀects
of the 2001 recession and the recent downturn.6 We focus on high productivity
countries, and adopt a threshold of .60 of the US level as our cutoﬀ. This leaves
us with 14 countries.7 For each country we express its values for each statistic
relative to the US. Table 3 presents the data for relative hours of work and relative
output per hour. In each case the countries are separated into two bins, those
with values less than .85 and those with values greater than .85.8
6GDP per worker is from the GGDC. Output per hour is then computed using data on
annuals hours worked per worker in employment, also from the GGDC. Total hours worked are
from the GGDC and the size of the population aged 15-64 is from the OECD.
7We have exlcluded Germany from the analysis for the reason that German productivity
decreased quite significantly following reunification. Prior to reunification Germany also had
productivity levels similar to the US. Relative to the pattern that we identify, Germany pre-
unification matches up very well, whereas post unification Germany becomes an outlier.
8Given our assumption of indivisible labor it may seem more appropriate to focus on employ-
ment rate diﬀerences rather than hours. It turns out that the relationship between employment
and productivity is similar.
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Table 3
Productivity and Hours Relative to the US
Hours Relative to US Y/H Relative to US
≤ .85 > .85 ≤ .85 > .85
Ita(.65) Swe(.86) NZ(.61) Den(.90)
Fra(.67) UK(.87) Jap(.71) Net(.90)
Bel(.69) Aus(.92) Swi(.79) Aut(.91)
Net(.72) NZ(.94) Aus(.82) Ita(.91)
Aut(.78) Can(.94) Can(.82) Bel(1.00)
Den(.84) Swi(.96) Swe(.83) Fra(1.01)
Jap(.99) UK(.85)
Looking at the table it is striking that the relative positions for the two values
are basically flipped. To see this more clearly Figure 1 provides a scatter plot of
the two series.
The figure reveals a striking negative correlation, and the correlation coeﬃcient
is −.83. The one apparent outlier at the bottom of the plot is New Zealand. A
simple OLS regression of relative output per hour on relative hours and a constant
gives a coeﬃcient of −.84 on relative hours with a standard error of .16 and an
R2 of .68. The regression equation “predicts" that average productivity in these
countries would would only be about 80% of the US level if hours worked were
the same as in the US.
It is of course possible that the above statistical relationship does not reflect
any underlying economic connection. But our analysis does oﬀer one explanation
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Figure 1: Figure 1: Hours and Productivity Relative to the US
for why this relationship does reflect a common underlying economic mechanism.
Countries such as Canada and Australia have hours worked similar to the US
and between 25 and 30 percent higher than countries like Belgium, France and
Italy. At the same time, output per hour in Australia and Canada is roughly
15% lower than in these other countries. If diﬀerences in hours of work are due
to diﬀerences in the scale of tax and transfer systems, then our model suggests
that countries such as Belgium, France and Italy should have productivity levels
about 15% higher than those in Australia and Canada, which is what is found
in the data. In other words, our model supports a view that says that most of
these countries have “true” productivity levels that are lower than the US, but
that the diﬀerences between the US and several European countries is masked by
the selection eﬀects associated with more generous transfer systems.9
9In this exercise we assume that countries are identical except for the tax and transfer scheme.
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5.2. Tax Rates and Tax Revenues
A key issue for policy makers is the relationship between tax rates and tax rev-
enues. As is well known, if labor supply decreases in response to increases in tax
rates this reduces the ability of government to raise additional revenue by raising
taxes. The Laﬀer curve is a simple graphical representation of this. The peak of
the Laﬀer curve corresponds to a tax rate at which the decrease in hours worked
perfectly oﬀsets the increase in tax rates.10 In the stand-in household model, the
tax base is proportional to total hours worked, since changes in tax rates do not
aﬀect the real wage, and the tax base is simply total hours times the real wage.
In this model, looking at the response of hours to a change in taxes can help us
gauge how close we are to the peak of the Laﬀer curve. In the incomplete mar-
kets model these calculations are more complex for two reasons. First, changes in
tax rates now aﬀect the capital to labor ratio and hence the wage rate. Second,
because there is a diﬀerence between hours and labor input, changes in hours do
not necessarily constitute a good proxy for the change in the labor tax base. Put
somewhat diﬀerently, if low productivity workers are the first to stop working in
response to increases in the size of the tax and transfer system, then the tax base
decreases much less quickly than do hours, so tax revenues may not fall as fast as
one would predict based on a stand-in household model.
To explore the quantitative significance of these factors we compare the impli-
It is possible that the idiosyncratic shock process also diﬀers across countries. Domeij and Floden
(2003) focused on diﬀerences in this process between Sweden and the US. An important issue
to keep in mind is that if the selection eﬀects are large then great care must be exercised in
estimating diﬀerences in shock processes across countries.
10See Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) for a recent analysis of the Laﬀer curve in the context of
cross country comparisons from the pespective of a stand-in household model.
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cations for tax revenues of changing taxes from 30% to 50% in the two models. As
we noted earlier, the implications for hours worked were quite similar in the two
cases. Comparing these two cases provides a good sense of the extent to which the
change in hours is misleading regarding the change in tax revenues from a given
increase in taxes. In the stand-household model the increase in tax revenues is
roughly 17%, whereas in the incomplete markets model the increase in tax rev-
enues is almost 41%. The general equilibrium eﬀect associated with the change
in wages is not the reason for this diﬀerence, as the increase in taxes actually
decreases wages by roughly 1% in the incomplete market model. Thus, this eﬀect
is both small and goes in the opposite direction. It follows that these selection
eﬀects are very important in predicting changes in tax revenues.
5.3. Wedge Calculations
Following the work of Parkin (1988), several economists have calculated wedges
in the context of a standard growth model as way to provide a useful diagnostic
about the model’s inability to account for the data on diﬀerent dimensions.11
Prescott (2004) and Ohanian et al (2008) have recently used this method applied
to the “static” first order condition from the growth model as a way to examine
diﬀerences in hours worked. These authors assumed a stand-in household model
to derive the equation that they then took to the data. Given the analysis above,
11This same methodology has been profitably employed in the business cycle literature by
Parkin (1988), Bencivenga (1992), Ingram, Kocherlakota, Savin (1994), Hall (1997), Gali,
Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002), and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002). Mulligan (2002)
uses this method to analyze changes in hours of work in the US over the 20th century, while
Cole and Ohanian (2004) use it to shed light on changes in hours worked during the U.S. Great
Depression.
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it is of interest to assess the extent to which this method might lead to biased
estimates of the wedge associated with taxes. Assuming a period utility function
of the form α log c+ [(1− α)/(1− γ)](1− h)1−γ, and a Cobb Douglas production
function with capital share θ, the key equation that these studies consider is given
by:
(1− α)
α
(1− hit)−γ
cit
= (1−∆it)(1− θ)
yit
hit
where ∆it is the period t wedge for country i. Assuming that all countries share
the same parameters, and normalizing the wedge in one country at one date tˆ to
equal zero, we can compute relative the relative wedge in country i at any date
using only data on h, c, and y since the other parameters will cancel. In a stand-in
household model with taxes as the only diﬀerence between countries, the wedges
will recover the tax rate diﬀerences that generated the data. Given the selection
eﬀects in the incomplete markets model it is not clear to what extent this method
will recover tax rates in that setting.12 To do this we consider countries with tax
rates ranging from .20 to .50, which basically reflects the range of tax rates in the
data since 1960, and apply this method to the steady state data. We solve for the
wedge in each country relative to the τ = .20 country. Given that we assumed
indivisible labor we carry out the calculation assuming γ = 0. Table 4 presents
the results.
Table 4
12In a similar model but in the context of business cycle shocks, Chang and Kim (2007) show
that the wedge will exhibit a pronounced cyclical pattern even though the model contains no
distortions to the labor-consumption tradeoﬀ.
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Implied Wedges Relative to τ = .20
τ = .20 τ = .30 τ = .40 τ = .50
0.00 .07 .17 .31
The table shows that bias is in the direction of understating the actual size
of the relative distortion. For underlying distortions that are less than 20% the
magnitude is probably not of first order importance, but for larger distortions it
does become significant. Moreover, when comparing countries with τ = .40 and
τ = .50 we see that the bias is in the other direction, with the wedge changing by
more than .10 going from one to the other.
6. Conclusion
We have examined the eﬀects of tax and transfer programs in a model charac-
terized by idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete markets, with a particular focus
on assessing the extent to which the eﬀects on allocations and welfare diﬀer from
those present in the stand-in household model. We find that the eﬀect of say a
twenty point increase in the tax rate on hours of work is very similar in the two
settings. However, the welfare eﬀects are dramatically diﬀerent. In the incom-
plete markets model a positive tax and transfer scheme is optimal, whereas in
the stand-in household model the optimal size of the tax and transfer scheme is
zero. Moreover, the welfare loss associated with having taxes set too high is much
smaller in the incomplete markets model. It is also noteworthy that the incom-
plete markets model predicts large eﬀects of taxes on average labor productivity,
because of the important selection eﬀects present in the model. These eﬀects may
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imply that countries in continental Europe still face a substantial productivity gap
with the US in terms of TFP. We conclude from this exercise idiosyncratic shocks
and incomplete markets are important features to be considered in the context of
assessing tax and transfer programs.
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